How Iraq Is Changing What We Do: Measuring Clearance in Urban Environments by Lodhammar, Pehr
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
Volume 22 
Issue 2 The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction Issue 22.2 
Article 5 
August 2018 
How Iraq Is Changing What We Do: Measuring Clearance in Urban 
Environments 
Pehr Lodhammar 
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal 
 Part of the Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and 
Conflict Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lodhammar, Pehr (2018) "How Iraq Is Changing What We Do: Measuring Clearance in Urban 
Environments," Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction: Vol. 22 : Iss. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction by an 
authorized editor of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu. 
30 SPOTLIGHT @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
How Iraq Is Changing What 
We Do: Measuring Clearance 
in Urban Environments
by Pehr Lodhammar [ UNMAS ]
Iraq is changing what we think, say, and do about mine ac-tion. The terms, standards, and measurements used by the humanitarian mine action (HMA) community need to be 
revised as Daesh remains a destabilizing influence. While the 
Al Maedam district of Mosul fell to Iraqi Security Forces in a 
‘last battle’ on 10 July 2017, the government declared an offi-
cial end to the conflict in Iraq on 10 December 2017.
Whereas HMA followed the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Accords, HMA started in East Mosul while fighter jets were 
still bombing West Mosul. Although defeated, Daesh remains 
active. One year later, the same pop-up tactics used by Daesh 
to harass communities continue with reports of killings, kid-
nappings, and also to disrupt explosive ordnance clearance 
operations, leading to the need for ‘day-of ’ adjustments to 
avoid potential new threats. Regrouping in parts of Kirkuk, 
Daquq, and Hawija, Daesh is now patrolling day and night, 
collecting taxes from locals. 
The distinction for explosive hazard clearance, whether con-
ducted as a peacekeeping or a humanitarian mission, is not 
trivial. When United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
Iraq teams enter communities for the first time, they come as 
unknowns, sometimes seen as extensions of a peacekeeping 
mission or an occupying foreign power. Their first task is to 
overcome suspicion and gain the trust of the local communi-
ty, street-by-street. Relying on community liaison officers flu-
ent in the local language and experienced operators selected 
for their interpersonal skills, teams endure a time-consuming 
but necessary process. However, these efforts yield an impor-
tant return: community sources that provide essential infor-
mation for teams to locate, survey, and assess contaminated 
sites. The second task is to deliver clearance in a timely way so 
that stabilization can happen sooner rather than later.1 
During 2018, funding for the explosive hazard response 
will be focused in the five priority governorates identified 
by the government of Iraq: Ninewa, Kirkuk, Anbar, Salah 
al Din, and Diyala, in addition to the explosive hazard 
activities supporting the five pillars of Iraq’s Recovery and 
Development Framework (RDF), and as documented within 
the Recovery, Resilience Programme (RRP) that were both 
officially launched at the Kuwait conference in February 2018.
Context
Delays work for Daesh while urgency works for an eco-
nomically thriving, politically-stable Iraq and for the Middle 
East region as a whole. Therein lies the strategic, geopoliti-
cal importance of explosive hazard clearance in Iraq today. 
International focus has shifted from the legacy of millions of 
landmines left from the Iran-Iraq War and two Gulf wars, a 
legacy that is now handled exclusively by Iraqi authorities, to 
the one-third of Iraq formerly occupied by Daesh. Roughly 
the equivalent of New York state, this region is home to more 
than 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDP) who still 
live in camps. Clearance contributes to a safe home for all. 
Producing stable communities is arguably the most im-
portant component of a shared Iraqi-international com-
munity soft power strategy to secure economic and social 
recovery.2 Communities depend upon stabilization pro-
grams, all of which cannot begin until explosive hazards 
have been removed. 
Adaptation
Initially, the comprehensive data collection phase that nor-
mally precedes explosive hazard clearance did not happen in 
Iraq for the following reasons: 
1. The urgent need to clear key infrastructure so as to be-
gin stabilization and humanitarian programs shifted 
government priorities.
2. The changing security conditions limited access to cer-
tain areas.
3. The time-consuming procedures for registration 
and accreditation of additional operators limited in- 
country resources.    
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Figure 1. Daesh continue to be a destabilizing force and potential threat to operations.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Aid Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) Media Monitoring Report, June 26, 2018/CISR.
Headlines as reported for 26 June 2018
• Official questions government’s intention to strip militias of arms  
(The Baghdad Post)
• Terrorists linked to kidnapping incident on Kirkuk road arrested (NINA)
• Kurdish citizen killed in Islamic State attack in Kirkuk (Iraqi News)
• Booby-trap found in the district of Hawija (NINA)
• Kurdish official makes serious warnings on IS re-emergence in Khanaqin  
(Bas News)
• IS insurgents raid south of Daquq (Bas News/Iraq TradeLink)
• Two terrorists arrested in Sulaymaniyah (NINA)
• Iraqi security in ongoing operation against Islamic State in Diyala: Local 
politician (Kurdistan 24)
• Diyala Operations Command announced the destruction of the so-called Sharia 
court and Daesh caches in operation to hunt down terrorists  
(NINA/The Baghdad Post)
• Four Islamic State members arrested in joint operation, north of Diyala  
(Iraqi News)
• Ten ISIS guesthouses torched as operation in Hamrin Mountains continues  
(The Baghdad Post)
• Seven IMIS terrorists killed, wounded in ISIS attack in Samarra  
(The Baghdad Post)
• Terrorist infiltrated from Syrian territory into Iraqi territory arrested 
(NINA)
Accordingly, the explosive hazard management community at 
large joined in support, with all operators assigned tasks from 
a common Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS) list devel-
oped and managed by Iraqi authorities and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) to coordinate clearance of 
critical infrastructure to be followed by repair and reconstruc-
tion known as stabilization programs. Many teams, including 
those funded by UNMAS, have achieved significant results in 
a relatively short period of time; however, early successes came 
with an indirect cost and a predictable result (see Figure 2).
Without comprehensive data collection as a starting 
point, the extent of contamination one year later remains 
an unknown pending completion of a comprehensive, non- 
technical survey and assessment of the liberated areas. UNMAS 
Iraq will field NTS teams during the latter part of 2018 to con-
duct this survey. Meanwhile, explosive hazard management 
and operations continue on a daily basis (see Figure 2).
The absence of a comprehensive survey to assess and quan-
tify contamination by type meant that UNMAS Iraq teams 
needed to integrate surveys into clearance tasks to record 
concentration, dispersal, location, and type of hazards, so 
that information could be shared with the government of 
Iraq. This has led to a catch-up effort to upload data into a de-
veloping information management system for shared use and 
transfer to Iraq’s Directorate of Mine Action (DMA).  
Unique Environment
In conventional mine action, if operators have access to the 
surface, they most likely have access to the threat. Whether 
arrayed in a pattern to defend a military position or used in 
isolation, landmines typically target personnel or vehicles. 
Their known fit-for-purpose design, properties, and function 
make landmine clearance a surface or near-surface activi-
ty; procedures and standards evolved accordingly. Similarly, 
clearance of known explosive remnants of war (ERW) —e.g., 
large, air-dropped munitions—even when buried or sub-
merged, differs mostly by proximity to the surface. 
In legacy contamination areas, such as along the Iran-Iraq 
border, Iraqi authorities focus conventional clearance meth-
ods on threats posed by unknown amounts of ERW and 
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In urban environments, the surface may be covered by mas-
sive amounts of debris. Contamination can include a mix of 
ammunition, air-dropped munitions, other ERW, suicide belts 
still attached to human remains, and IEDs placed by Daesh 
forces as they withdrew. An estimated 7 million tons of con-
taminated debris in West Mosul await clearance. While the 
landmines estimated to be in the millions. In liberated ar-
eas of Iraq, the mix of conventional threats with improvised 
explosive devices (IED) adds a three-dimensional aspect to 
clearance since the operator must contend not only with haz-
ards on or below the surface but with IEDs placed in walls, 
ceilings, fixtures, etc. 
During the 12-month period ending June 2018, UNMAS Iraq teams 
assessed and cleared critical sites and conducted training in both 
urban and rural areas.   
• More than 350 explosive devices from 30,000 sq m bordering a power grid 
serving 60,000 people and seven schools near Fallujah.
• Thirty-four IEDs weighing a total of 435 kg from a fuel station in Jadidah—
enough to completely destroy the building, and kill or injure anyone within 
a 100-m radius.
• Forty-four IEDs from under or on the Fallujah ‘New Bridge,’ totaling 380–400 
kg of homemade explosives. UNMAS divers found and safely removed two submerged 
IEDs from Fallujah’s ‘Iron Bridge.’
• Forty-four IEDs, 51 main charges, three items of unexploded ordnance, and 
343 IED component parts from a 37,995 sq m asphalt factory in Fallujah.
• Forty-plus IEDs along a 50-m stretch of road which, due to earth compacted 
by rains, made search-find-remove-and-render-safe extremely hazardous for 
operators.
• From commencement of clearance operations in Mosul’s Old City on 28 November 
2017 through 31 May 2018, UNMAS teams completed 790 tasks resulting in the 
removal of approximately 33,500 explosive hazards, including 610 suicide 
belts.
• In the Al Maedam district alone, 491 explosive hazards, of which 232 were 
suicide belts, and of these, approximately 100 were removed from human 
remains.
• Conducted 70 surveys in Al-Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa governorates in 
support of high priority stabilization and humanitarian interventions.
• Removed 15,700 ERW and 900 IEDs, including 610 suicide belts in liberated 
areas.
• Conducted 750 clearance tasks enabling the UNDP and government to begin 
rehabilitation of critical infrastructures.
• Completed 10 joint assessment missions enabling the United Nations and 
humanitarian partners to deliver aid in liberated areas.
• Trained 170 police officers in first response techniques, including identification, 
marking, and reporting explosive hazards; and 20 U.N. security staff to 
safely respond to IED and explosive-hazard threats.
• Trained 1,600 UNDP cash-for-work employees, 800 government, and 300 U.N./NGO 
staff working in high-risk environments to recognize and behave safely in the 
presence of explosive hazards.
• Conducted risk education sessions attended by 147,000 people in schools, IDP 
camps, and other high-priority areas.
Figure 2. Critical sites cleared.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/CISR.
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presence of IEDs in Mosul varies by district, five of Mosul’s 
eight districts searched through June 2018 yielded 27,000 ex-
plosive hazards. Until battle damaged buildings are searched 
and debris is safely inspected, managed, and removed, 
there is no way to know the extent and level of the three- 
dimensional contamination. 
In rural environments, IEDs arrayed in belts have substitut-
ed for landmines to defend combatant positions during conflict 
and continue to contaminate agricultural land.3 IEDs have also 
been used to deny villagers access to wells, schools, government 
offices, and virtually any other asset essential to livelihood. 
If the HMA community considers the use of IEDs in Iraq as 
a fundamental change to explosive hazard clearance, what is 
a satisfactory term for an acceptable clearance standard for 
this surface-and-above threat? Whether debris from col-
lapsed buildings or the space within a battle-damaged build-
ing, the problem deals with volume and certification, not just 
of cleared land but also of cleared space. The International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) do not have such a reference, 
but if experience in Iraq to date is an indicator of a need for 
similar environments, IMAS may need such a reference 
and the development of a surface-and-above standard. The 
implications of such a standard would seem important for 
the HMA community for certification and for accountabil-
ity purposes.4 
For certification, cleared buildings, debris management, 
and disposal need standards. However, in an environment 
such as Iraq, the community may need to settle for some-
thing less than previously accepted standards. With debris 
and structural assets above ground, what if 100 percent 
clearance is not possible? What level of risk is acceptable? 
Compared to conventional clearance, what are the implica-
tions for time, cost, and the priority of tasks and commit-
ment of resources?
The search conducted at Fallujah’s Iron Bridge may serve 
as a case in point for an honest and open exchange of views. 
The impact of the open bridge measured in socioeconom-
ic terms is arguably the real outcome of clearance and 
should be a measurement of success rather than the linger-
ing perception that the operation cleared only two IEDs for 
Iron Bridge, Fallujah 
Reconstruction suspended in February 2018 due to suspected IEDs at or below 
waterline.
• Total dive time underwater: 17 hours and 53 minutes
• April 8 - Dive team briefed
• April 9 - Dive 1 to check conditions:
 » Water depth at 7.0 meters 
 » Current of 5 to 6 knots
 » Visibility at 3 cm due to the current
 » Divers adjust plan, hold onto the bridge structure continually or be 
swept away from the task, slowing progress
• April 9 - Dive 2 
 » Suspected main charge case was found and photographed 
 » Fingertip search established that no other hazards were present, i.e., 
battery pack detonator or pressure plate
• April 9 - Dive 3, suspected main charge (1) safely recovered
• April 10 - Dive 4, suspected main charge (2) safely recovered
• April 11 - Dives suspended, following holidays, resume 
• April 14 - Dives continue: An AK47 assault rifle was located and recovered
• April 15 - Dives conclude, confirming no further hazards
• Area searched: 900 sq. m. 
• Found:
 » Two IEDs, 20 kg main charge cases, plastic, filled with homemade 
explosives (HME)
 » One AK47 assault rifle
Figure 3. Case study: Iron Bridge, Fallujah.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/CISR.
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a week’s effort. What matters is that the elimination of the 
threat led to the resumption of the rehabilitation work.
If all tasks on the stabilization list are deemed high value and 
there is no way to quantify cost-benefit, they must compete 
with one another on some basis for purposes of priority. But 
what is that basis? Since priority remains a matter for Iraqi au-
thorities to decide, UNMAS Iraq’s best response is to antici-
pate needs and quickly deploy clearance assets in the case of 
Fallujah’s Iron Bridge case study (see Figure 3). 
Eliminate Suspicion
Whether mine action ultimately returns cleared land or 
cleared space to communities, eliminating suspected threats 
and achieving security and safety should be a measure of suc-
cess. Even if nothing is found, the suspicion of IEDs needs to 
be removed before rehabilitation can begin. While the prob-
lem of “who comes first” belongs to the government, the so-
lution is partly a function of the HMA community and its 
ability to mobilize, deploy, and use resources efficiently based 
on an internationally agreed upon common value statement 
or model for determining socioeconomic gains, e.g., clearing 
Fallujah’s Iron Bridge saves the community time and addition-
al fuel costs attributable to detours.
Impact
This value statement should speak to the impact of mine 
action instead of the number of explosive hazards cleared. 
Although UNMAS Iraq teams typically clear enough ex-
plosive hazards in a given week to fill a 20-ft (6-m) contain-
er, such inventories are quantitative measures of explosive 
hazard management, which understate the cost-benefit, value 
-added, and socio-economic outcomes associated with envi-
ronments such as Iraq with its 1.9 million IDPs waiting to 
safely return home.
Consider the lesson learned by the Fallujah Iron Bridge ex-
perience: if the operation were measured in terms of contami-
nation alone, the two IEDs destroyed during the week-long 
effort would seem costly in terms of efforts expended, yet 
more than commensurate when valued by the socio-econom-
ic impact. Effectively, this indicates that the mine action com-
munity should reevaluate its model for measuring outcome 
for nonconventional clearance.
Inevitably, limited resources delay stabilization and hu-
manitarian tasks in post-conflict environments. Similarly, 
UNMAS surveyed and assessed clearance needs for two tex-
tile factories in western Mosul used by Daesh to manufac-
ture ammunition. The buildings were believed hit by two 
500–1000 lb (226.8–453.6 kg) airdrop weapons, one of which 
exploded when delivered.5 Clearance will require inten-
sive manual operations since the building structures could 
be severely damaged by the use of mechanical assets. When 
operational, the factory employs approximately 6,500 staff—
mostly women—producing textiles largely for export.
In rural areas, the devastation may appear less, but the net 
effect is the same: denial of the means of production and loss 
of livelihoods. IEDs arrayed in a traditional minefield pattern 
are known to contaminate some agricultural land; similarly, 
individual IEDs contaminate key infrastructure, such as the 
village well in Al Bokald near West Mosul. 
Figure 4. Case study: Al-Shifa Hospital, Al Maedam district, West Mosul.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/CISR.
Al-Shifa Hospital, Al Maedam district
• Used by Daesh as a treatment center and for ammunition and IED manufacturing
• August–September 2017: Phase 1 clearance of accessible areas: 653 explosive 
hazards and 10 kg of IEDs removed
• April 2018: Phase 2 clearance of previously inaccessible areas begins using 
newly arrived armored heavy equipment and manual methods to remove
 » 4 kg of improvised explosives
 » 85 explosive hazards
 » 48 small arms ammunition (SAA)
 » 12,350 kg of de-bulleted SAA (Daesh propellant harvesting)
 » 29,945 m3 of rubble and debris
• May 2018: Clearance complete
• June 2018: Site reverts to UNDP and reconstruction begins
5
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Following clearance, the now-repaired Al Qasoor 
Water Treatment Plant in East Mosul again supplies 
clean and safe water to more than 300,000 people 
across 34 service areas. In Ninewa province, follow-
ing clearance, the land registry office offers access 
deeds to validate land claims of residents seeking re-
turn. Following clearance of the fuel station in Al 
Jadidah, 20 employees pump fuel for more than 300 
vehicles daily after a three-year hiatus. Following 
clearance and repairs to the Fallujah Iron Bridge, 
travel time for some residents to the only maternity 
hospital in a 50 km (31.1 mi) radius will be reduced 
from two hours to five minutes. Moreover, the as-
phalt factory reopened after four years and will em-
ploy 65 workers when operating at full capacity.
Difficult Choices
Looking back with perfect hindsight does not solve the 
problem for government decision makers responsible for 
determining task priority. The model to predict socio- 
economic benefits is not new but the application of such 
thinking to mine action probably is.6 The problem comes 
with the value judgment made between a large workforce 
employed by the Mosul textile factory previously mentioned 
and a small agricultural community dependent upon land 
contaminated with an IED belt. While the decision on where 
to prioritize clearance does not belong to the HMA com-
munity, standardizing the mine action variables involved in 
efficiently delivering clearance can influence this decision be-
ginning with operational and security reasons. The anticipa-
tion of needs, operational flexibility, and response is key for 
the HMA community. However, in terms of clearance, Iraq’s 
working environment is unique in a number of ways: 
• Narrow, cluttered streets increase clearance time in ur-
ban environments, whereas relatively open spaces in 
some outlying neighborhoods and rural areas may take 
less time.
• Travel time to and from sites and checkpoints effective-
ly limit teams’ access to sites. For example, there are 14 
checkpoints between the UNMAS Iraq base in Erbil and 
contamination sites in Betu, Kirkuk, and Naweji, exten-
sively reducing clearance time to half a day of work.
• Heavy contamination linked to human remains causes 
a stop-start-stop sequence to clearance, whether manual 
or mechanical. Mechanical operations stop-start-stop for 
each new discovery to allow government authorities to re-
cover, identify, and return the remains for a proper burial.
• Deteriorating security conditions influence operations. 
Clearance teams use diversionary routes to avoid pre-
dictability, adding time to mission planning and execu-
tion. Armored vehicles located close to operations may 
limit access to certain areas entirely.
• Specialized and highly-trained operators, as with the 
Fallujah Iron Bridge divers who deployed in record 
time, may lead to the government reprioritizing clear-
ance based on asset availability.
Quality Assurance
Complexity of design, manufacture, and quantity of IEDs 
creates a mix of threats and a unique operating environment 
for clearance teams in Iraq. IEDs vary significantly by manu-
facturing methods. IEDs have been found in artificial rocks, in 
air conditioning units, and under hanging garments triggered 
by an infrared device. Components can include repurposed 
common objects such as plastic tubing, washing machine 
timers, and syringes. In one of two bomb factories located 
within the Al-Shifa Hospital complex, UNMAS teams found 
more than 150,000 electronic components intended for use in 
IED manufacture (see Figure 4).
The combination of scarce resources and/or inadequate 
clearance, as well as IDPs eager to return home inevitably lead 
to cleared areas being recontaminated. For example, when re-
turnees collect explosive hazards from their land and homes 
and deposit these in an already cleared street, this leads to re-
contamination and creates problems in terms of mapping, re-
cording, and managing data. 
Although Daesh officially has been defeated, daily security 
reports confirm what UNMAS Iraq teams know from experi-
ence in the field: Daesh remains an active if sporadic threat, 
often returning to recontaminate cleared areas.7 
Al-Shifa Hospital: before and after.
Image courtesy of Google Earth.
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Al-Shifa Hospital: armored heavy equipment operations.
Image courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/George Tan.
Aerial view of Al-Shifa Hospital.
Image courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/George Tan.
Al-Shifa Hospital interior.
Image courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/George Tan.
Observations
Convention. Iraq’s National Strategic and Executive Plan for 
Mine Action 2017–2021 outlines Iraq’s commitment to work 
toward a safe environment free from explosive hazards, desig-
nating the DMA as the national authority for explosive hazard 
management charged with the responsibility to survey, mark, 
and render safe 50 percent of known contamination by 2021. 
Iraq’s commitment to the National Strategic and Executive 
Plan currently covers only landmines and ERW, not IEDs.
Outcomes. UNMAS Iraq reports explosive hazard 
management results in terms of square meters and items 
cleared on a monthly basis; however, without an accompany-
ing narrative, numbers can understate the complexity of the 
situation. Planning is integral for both mine action profes-
sionals and those agencies responsible for stabilization and 
humanitarian tasks.
Priorities. Should we clear rural communities last be-
cause urban populations are larger? Do the 50 families in 
Al Bokald matter any less than the 6,500 workers waiting 
to return to their jobs in the textile factory? Government 
7
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Euphrates Rive with near zero visibility.
Image courtesy of Wtorplast.
Divers at the Iron Bridge in Fallujah. 
Image courtesy of Wtorplast.
authorities could benefit from a system that measures an 
economic and/or social return and avoids perceptions of 
political, ethnic, or other arbitrary inf luences when setting 
priorities. The HMA community can assist decision makers 
with this responsibility by efficiently managing and deploy-
ing assets and managing conditions that reduce task times 
while meeting quality standards. 
Assessment. How might government authorities assure 
themselves and donor organizations of maintaining capaci-
ty once it is enhanced? One idea the mine action community 
might adopt is to formally recognize the need to recertify staff 
based on peer reviews or skill audits conducted by a profes-
sional board or regulatory authority as commonly practiced 
by other professions. Organizations and individuals would 
need to meet standards and demonsrate proficiency in man-
aging information and conducting surveys as well as generat-
ing, monitoring, and closing tasks.
Costs. Although explosive hazard clearance precedes stabi-
lization and humanitarian tasks, the HMA community has 
yet to recognize high-value clearance, as illustrated by the 
8
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Iron Bridge, Fallujah.
Image courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service.
Fallujah Iron Bridge or scenarios involving long-distance 
travel, high-threat environments, physical constraints such as 
heavy debris, collapsed buildings, or limited access to infra-
structure, all of which add to costs. For many, the convention-
al thinking and measures regarding cost date from battle area 
clearance or legacy mine fields where experience says clear-
ance can cost as little as US$3.50 for one meter cubed (one 
square meter to a depth of one meter). The HMA community 
needs to develop and refine appropriate benchmarks as a basis 
for value statements consistent with clearance costs related to 
stabilization and humanitarian returns. 
Disposal. Although the Iraqi government understandably 
restricts exclusive use of explosives to Iraqi Security Forces, 
this procedure demands the secure and timely transportation 
of explosive hazards to secure sites for safe disposal to avoid 
potential buildups of large amounts of explosive hazards. A 
handover methodology and a certification procedure could 
leverage available international organization expertise to in-
clude destruction after rendering safe, removal, and collec-
tion of explosive hazards, thereby maintaining accountability 
while alleviating a potential delay.
Knowledge management. IED removal is predicated on 
problem-solving skills and understanding how the devices 
function so as to identify the different components. How 
IEDs are manufactured, function, IED composition vari-
ety, and knowing what to look for before going into the 
field have become daily tasks for operators and caused 
UNMAS Iraq to re-invent its information/knowledge 
management capabilities.   
Community. UNMAS Iraq has relied extensively on com-
munity liaison officers to help establish trust with the local 
community to gather information regarding possible IED 
9
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locations and areas to avoid should Daesh have a presence. 
Casual cash-for-work cadres when trained have proven suc-
cessful as a multiplier for areas thought to be cleared when 
paired with other UNMAS clearance teams. Cash-for-work 
workers are hired as casual laborers to remove debris in de-
stroyed neighborhoods in Mosul and elsewhere. While they 
are hired only to remove and clear debris, they are given risk 
education to be able to identify, report, and warn of explosive 
hazards. By doing this, local citizens identify and report on 
potential hazards. 
See endnotes page 62
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